Another comment about the Venezuelan police force

The Venezuelan people believe Maduro is illegitimate, a tyrant backed by gangsters and communist fanatics. Over 60 nations agree with this position, which is backed by the National Assembly, the State Prosecutor (now in exile), and the judges of the Supreme Court forced to flee in 2017 because they weren’t about to follow Maduro’s orders. 

On February 23 we saw Maduro and his wife Cilia dancing salsa as his repression forces were shooting up Santa Elena de Uairen, a town inhabited by Pemones who had rebelled against the local National Guard unit keeping away the humanitarian aid convoy coming from Brazil. The next day his Vice President, Delci Rodriguez, a psychopath who stated publicly that the suffering of the Venezuelan people was her payback for the death of her father about 40 years ago, got on TV wearing a Hamas scarf, saying “they haven’t seen but a tiny fraction of what we are capable of doing”. 

Yesterday the Supreme Court justices in exile issued a decision supporting the use of force by other nations to provide humanitarian aid and protect the people from the mobster hiding in Miraflores. So the question now for Venezuelans is how to proceed. I realize many communists who write here aren’t about to be swayed by rational arguments, so I’m writing this for decent readers who have common sense: 

I have proposed to Venezuelan leaders that a Police Force must be recruited from the Venezuelan exile community, numbering about 20 thousand men and women, which can include military personnel who have fled in recent years (the Colombian government reported yesterday that 160 military had crossed over the border on or since Feb 23, and I’m aware that several hundred Venezuelans are young and fit US Army and Marines veterans). The emphasis is on POLICE, because this force would be heavily armed but its mission would be to escort humanitarian aid and establish law and order over rural sectors of the country where the population is suffering horribly, like Santa Elena de Uairen, San Cristobal, and other areas where almost 100% of the population is against Maduro’s rule and has suffered collective punishment. 

Guaidó has the ability to pay $200 million to outfit this force, and additional funds which can be drawn from Venezuela’s state accounts and CITGO dividends. But he doesn’t have the ability to make them into a cohesive force, transport them, or give them priceless air support. 

This would have to be provided by others, and the best source would be a US carrier air wing aboard the USS Abraham Lincoln. The logistics support, consisting of the delivery of tons of food, medicine, fuel, water plants, and other consumables can best be delivered to a Venezuelan port controlled by Venezuelans loyal to the Constitution and the National Assembly (Guaidó is Interim President only because he was elected National Assembly President in January 5 2019, and his power derives from this Parliament, which is free to remove him and vote for a different president). 

Evidently we want to avoid US boots on the ground, therefore the initial activity to manage the first port taken by the Police would have to be manned by Colombian civilians. It would also be useful to have the Colombian military to provide two battalions of well armed troops to maintain the peace and protect the ports from saboteurs and terrorists. But that’s a bilateral issue between Venezuela and Colombia, the same way any arrangements to stage Venezuelan police forces at Boa Vista before they rescue Santa Elena and the native Pemon who rebelled against Maduro will be a bilateral issue between the two countries. 

As the Venezuelan police force begins to free these small sectors of the country we would also need an IMF loan to keep buying large quantities of food, medicine, hospital equipment, camps to house medical personnel near hospitals in well protected settings, seed, agricultural equipment, live cattle, and other items needed to start rebuilding. You wouldn’t understand how much has been destroyed, looted, eaten, trampled or burned by the communists as they tried to implement their “21st Century Socialism”. 

So as you can see, I believe the best option is to keep foreigners out of Venezuela as much as possible, for two reasons: I don’t think it’s a good idea for foreigners to die or get hurt when Venezuelan forces can do the job and also because this will water down the propaganda that’s already pouring heavy from the leftist community. But this will work much much better with that US Air wing providing support from a carrier, plus Predators and four AC130’s based in Colombia and at a location I can’t name.

A police Force is the answer

Daniel, the optimum solution is for Guaidó to request assistance to create a 100% Venezuelan police force, with a core made up of military personnel who fled and will flee. I believe it can start with about 5000 but has to grow to at least 20000. 

A sound intervention strategy has to aim to preserve the armed forces structure and as much personnel as possible, therefore what is needed is a group of well armed police (using the term police is important even though they can be armed with full military gear). The regime is relying on convicts, colectivos, and small contingents of PNB and GNB to do the heavy lifting. Therefore a ground force focused on taking control of a small part of national territory, BACKED with air, naval, and logistical support provided by other nations, can have success. Rule of thumb tells us that 5000 "police", backed by an air carrier air wing can control an area with 100,000 inhabitants quite easily. Thus the initial target has to be a small city, or a rural area with small towns.

Let's observe what was regime response to events on the 23rd: in Ureña they used small GNB contingents which numbered about 50 at each bridge, and the presence of Iris Varela tells me the "security forces" must have been, or included, convicts. The response to the Pemon rebellion in Santa Elena de Uairen was a convoy of school buses loaded with colectivos, milicianos, and some PNB and GNB which proceeded to shoot up the town. 

Therefore I deduce the regime lacks a rapid response force, it's made up of lightly armed irregulars, and can't use the Armed Forces AS LONG AS THE ENTRY IS BY ARMED VENEZUELANS BRINGING FOOD, MEDICINE, AND SECURITY. 

Using the same rule of thumb I explained, with a 20000 strong force it's possible to control an area with 1 million inhabitants. The premise is that close air support will be available. And that logistics are set up to provide food medicine water, gas bottles and power. 

Once this expeditionary force has one million within its control, it should start receiving a flux of volunteers to allow creation of a militia. Whole military units may shift allegiance, and thus the main issue will be figuring out how to sort out spies and saboteurs. I have used a boilerplate ratio precisely because I'm afraid the regime will be infiltrating their guys. 

So what's the Cuban reaction going to be? They can't send bus convoys loaded with colectivos because they would be cut off by air power, they are unlikely to send army units, the navy and Air Force will be useless, and they will see that, once a significant force has punched through that cellophane they use to keep 30 million Venezuelans hostage, all they can do is caused a bunch of dead and risk the capture of Cubans who will reveal their role in Venezuela. 

I'm describing this to you openly because I think that once they know this is coming down the road, they'll start figuring out how to fold and get out while the getting is good.